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THEMARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
IN THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY: SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION
Edward J. Janger*
Firms in financial difficulty are often targets for takeover. There are
many reasons for this. The owners may be shopping the company, shopping
for capital, or just trying to stay afloat. The managers may be hoping to keep
their jobs. The creditors may be looking for an exit strategy. Investors may
see an undervalued business that can be bought on the cheap, key asset or
business synergies that can be purchased at a good price, or a competitor that
can be taken off the map. These things will be true whether or not the firm
has filed for bankruptcy, but if the firm files, the legal regime for both
realization of value and governance changes from state corporate law to
federal bankruptcy law.
For the purposes of this symposium, firms may exist in four not entirely
distinct states: (1) solvent; (2) in the zone of insolvency; (3) insolvent; and
(4) in a bankruptcy proceeding. Further, investors seeking to realize on the
value of insolvent and nearly insolvent firms may choose: (1) liquidation; (2)
a going concern sale; or (3) recapitalization. Again, all three of these
scenarios can be accomplished under state law or under the Bankruptcy Code.
Each regime has its strengths and weaknesses.
This symposium considers issues of governance and realization in
change of control transactions of distressed firms across these legal regimes,
hopefully shedding light on the regimes themselves and on their interaction.
Throughout this volume, three two-part questions recur, but each time
these questions are cast in a different light:
1) How should governance power be allocated:
a. practically—in the form of situational leverage; and
b. formally—through formal decision-making authority?
2) How should enterprise value be allocated:
a. by entitlement; or
b. through bargaining?
3) What is the role of process:
a. in assuring transparency; and
b. limiting opportunistic behavior?
These questions, and the structure of this symposium, are informed by
prior work of Melissa Jacoby, Edward Janger, and Adam Levitin on value
allocation, governance, and the role of process in bankruptcy. This
introduction will briefly describe that conceptual landscape, and then situate
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the extraordinary contributions to this volume within and without that
framework.
Inside and outside of bankruptcy, entitlement and governance are in-
extricably linked. Debt takes priority over equity. The residual claimant,
whoever they may be, bears the greatest risk, gets to make decisions, and is
the beneficiary of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. However, as Dan Greenwood
points out in his contribution to this symposium, this link does not matter
much for solvent companies; the officers and directors simply tend to the
company’s business. The duty of loyalty only comes into play in cases of
serious conflict or self-dealing. However, when a company nears and/or en-
ters insolvency, questions of firm value implicate both value allocation and
governance rights. The location of the residual claim is uncertain, and so is
the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty. Outside of bankruptcy, there is often a
mismatch. In bankruptcy, there is a wrestling match.
First, insolvency complicates governance. Creditors, trading partners,
key managers, and others can take advantage of a debtor’s vulnerable
situation by threatening to destroy the business.One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-
to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy1 considers how the liquidity of debt
and modern capital markets can distort decision-making even further.
Outside of bankruptcy, the liquidity of debt and equity as well as modern
derivatives can create opportunities for investor opportunism. These
concerns continue in bankruptcy, while in addition, a combination of
supermajority voting, and the possibility of decoupling voting power and
financial interest make it possible for investors to take highly leveraged short
positions and use them to distort the dynamics of plan confirmation through
holdout behavior.
Second, insolvency complicates questions of distributional entitlement.
Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 112 seeks to tease
apart the priorities among creditors that come into play once a company is
insolvent. For solvent companies, there is a single value waterfall that flows
from debt (which gets paid in full), to preferred equity (which receives a
distributional priority), to common equity (which receives the residual value
and voting rights). For insolvent companies, there are instead two waterfalls:
one tied to assets, where the secured creditor has priority, and a second tied
to the residual, unencumbered, value of the firm. This entitlement baseline
establishes the parameters of bankruptcy bargaining and has implications for
who makes decisions. Governance power should always rest with the residual
claimant on the “value” rather than the “asset” waterfall.
Finally, bankruptcy law relies on certain procedural protections to
address these uncertainties surrounding decision-making and distribution in
1. See generally Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market
Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing governance).
2. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and
Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018) (discussing value allocation).
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insolvency. As a general rule, deviations from statutory entitlements should
only occur if accompanied by consent, or compliance with the plan
confirmation process. But these process protections have been under attack.
Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy3
shows how all asset sales, closed outside the context of a confirmed plan of
reorganization, endanger the procedural protections designed to safeguard
decisions about value maximization and protect distributional entitlements.
Such quick sales potentially place toomuch power in the hands of asset-based
claimants who may use crisis leverage to seize both governance power
(control) and value. The procedural shortcut created by quick sales
potentially distorts entitlements, bargaining, and governance incentives.
In short, efficient corporate control transactions in bankruptcy and
insolvency can be distorted both by process and its absence. Procedural
shortcuts can be used opportunistically to shut down information flows and
lock-up a transaction, while procedural devices can also be used strategically
to enhance the power of holdouts. The task of the symposium is to explore
and untangle these competing dynamics. The two broad themes that emerge
are the importance of transparency and process to ensure that value is being
maximized and allocated fairly.
The first group of Articles in this symposium issue focus on information
flows. Henry T. C. Hu sets forth a version of the problem focused on
transparency both inside and outside of bankruptcy. He notes that it is nothing
new to say that firms on the eve of bankruptcy may be lax about filing their
required securities disclosure and may be factually reticent in their
description of the firm’s distress. However, he adds that recent tightening of
requirements for class actions and for challenging the “Management’s
Disclosure and Analysis” section in disclosures have made this problem even
worse, particularly for companies in financial distress. He then explores how
the so-called “empty creditor” problem can affect information flows once the
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. Jay Westbrook explores the ways in which
the corporate form and jurisdictional boundaries can be used to partition
assets and claims in ways that distort distributional entitlements in corporate
groups. Westbrook points out that, to the extent these attributes are
transparent, they can be justified, but they can also defeat legitimate
expectations. He suggests a transparency-based solution, arguing for a
disclosure regime that would require asset and liability partitions to be
disclosed to be enforceable. Andrew Verstein continues this focus on
information flows, and its role in ensuring a liquid market for businesses
inside and outside of bankruptcy. He looks at insider trading law and teases
out the differences in the way it applies in and out of bankruptcy.
3. See generallyMelissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing process).
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From disclosure and transparency, the Articles then shift to issues of
governance in insolvency. Each of the Articles, in a different way, challenges
the idea that traditional concepts of fiduciary duty will provide much
guidance in insolvency and its vicinity. Instead, each emphasizes the
importance of court supervision, process, information, and bargaining as
essential safeguards. John Pottow explores the role of fiduciary duties in
guiding trustees in bankruptcy. He notes that, in bankruptcy, value
maximization and value distribution are often linked. When the duty to
maximize value, and the duty to allocate it according to statutory entitlement
conflict, fiduciary duties give no guidance. Pottow concludes that the
bankruptcy process, rather than duty per se is what safeguards the distributive
choices inherent in bankruptcy cases. Dan Greenwood carries this skepticism
of traditional governance principles even further. He starts with a somewhat
revolutionary suggestion, arguing that profit maximization is an
inappropriate criterion for guiding corporate decision-making, and that this
problem is compounded insolvency. He advocates displacing incumbent
management, and instead proceeding with a trustee who would operate the
company for the benefit of undiversified creditors—employees, pensioners,
and sometimes suppliers. Stephen J. Lubben and Oscar Couwenberg,
continue this theme, examining the various ways in which change of control
transactions in bankruptcy can be used by the proponents to capture private
benefits at the expense of other claimants against the estate. They suggest
that since distressed debt markets are thin, the market for corporate control
will not police these transactions. Finally, Janger and Levitin close the
volume with a discussion of restructuring support agreements. They, like
Lubben and Couwenberg, seek to find a set of principles that help identify
change of control transactions that transfer private benefits. They look
specifically at restructuring support agreements, otherwise known as RSAs.
These are agreements entered into between creditors and sometimes the
debtor prior to or during the bankruptcy case under which the parties agree
to support a particular plan or reorganization. These RSAs do not solicit
votes, per se, but instead contemplate that the case will proceed to a
confirmed plan of reorganization. However, RSAs can sometimes operate as
an end-run, limiting access to information and short circuiting process
protections. Janger and Levitin identify a number of “badges of
opportunism,” provisions in an RSA that suggest that a proponent of the plan
may be holding value maximization hostage in order to reorder the priority
scheme.
The lesson of the symposium taken as a whole is that insolvency
interposes a number of imperfections to the market for corporate control.
Crisis gives leverage to various parties, and the power to limit information
flows and extract private benefits. Attention to statutory processes can serve,
when used judiciously, to increase transparency and assure the fairness of
distributional choices.
